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The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: An
Analysis of Its Impact on the Relationship of Law
Firm Dissolution, Contingent Fee Cases and the
No 'Compensation Rule
Mark I. Weinstein*
The four law partners looked at each other with painful glanc-
es. They had been together for many years and started the firm
on a handshake and an oral agreement to split income and lia-
bilities equally. Each partner had contributed an equal amount
of capital to start the firm. They had trusted each other to the
point that no one had ever raised the prospect of a written part-
nership agreement let alone dissolution. But sitting at the end of
the conference table was one of the partners having just an-
nounced that he wanted to dissolve the partnership and take his
considerable collection of contingency fee cases with him. The
other partners were stunned. Could he really expect to keep these
cases and not share the income realized from them? How could
they stop him? How could they resolve this situation in a way
that would be fair and equitable to all the partners?
INTRODUCTION
The subject of this Article focuses on the concerns raised in
this opening scene. It compares the results under the Uniform
Partnership Act (the "UPA") with the potential results under the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act (the "RUPA")' while examin-
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1. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act, also referred to as the Uniform
Partnership Act of 1993, was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and was approved and recommended for enactment in all
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ing the impact on the relationship of law firm dissolutions and
contingent fee cases. Specifically, this Article focuses on the "No
Compensation Rule" of section 18(f) of the UPA and the case law
developed thereunder, and compares that section to section
401(h) of the RUPA.2
Under the general heading of "A Partner's Rights & Duties,"
Section 401(h) of the RUPA provides as follows:
A partner is not entitled to remuneration for services performed for the
partnership, except for reasonable compensation for services rendered in
winding up the business of the partnership.'
This section omits the reference to a "surviving" partner that is
currently found in section 18(f) of the UPA. The comments pro-
vided by the drafting committee state:
Subsection (h) continues the UPA § 18(f) rule that a partner is not enti-
tled to remuneration for services performed except in winding up the
partnership. Subsection (h) omits the reference to a "surviving" partner
in JPA § 18(f). This means that any partner winding up the business is
entitled to compensation, not just a surviving partner winding up after
the death of another partner.'
As of the time of writing this Article, three states have already
adopted the RUPA. They are Montana, Texas, and Wyoming.'
Each of these states has adopted the precise language of Section
401(h) of the RUPA. In the case of Montana, by adopting section
401(h) verbatim, it has adopted a legislative enactment that is
contrary to its prior decisional case law.6 Such an enactment is
of significant importance as various other state legislatures de-
bate the wisdom of adopting the RUPA, and specifically section 401(h).7
the states at its annual conference in Charleston, South Carolina, July 30-August 6,
1993. The official comments were completed in October, 1993.
2. The "No Compensation Rule" refers to the rule which denies a partner
entitlement to compensation for services performed for the partnership other than
reasonable compensation to a surviving partner. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(f), 6
U.L.A. 213 (1969). See Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984);
Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 189-92 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983); Frates v. Nichols, 167 So. 2d 77, 80-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
3. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401(h) (1993).
4. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401(h) cmt. 8.
5. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-10-101 to 35-10-644 (1993); TEx. REV. CIw. STAT.
ANN. art. 6132b-1.01 to 6132b-10.04 (West 1994); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-21-101 to
17-21-1003 (1994).
6. See, e.g., Mehl v. Mehl, 786 P.2d 1173 (Mont. 1990); In re Mondale &
Johnson, 437 P.2d 636 (Mont. 1968).
7. See Gull v. Van Epps, 517 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Wis. 1994) (upholding the No
Compensation Rule and stating that if the rule against extra compensation was to
be modified, it was up to the legislature to revise UPA by adopting the RUPA).
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It is this author's contention that the logical interpretation of
the language in the comments accompanying 401(h) leads to the
conclusion that the drafters fully intend that this provision over-
turn a considerable body of case law which has applied and de-
fined the No Compensation Rule.' This author supports this new
provision; however, the drafters did not provide or articulate a
standard, formula, or methodology to be utilized by courts faced
with this issue of requested compensation. Accordingly, the final
section of this Article will suggest a standard that courts may
use when confronted with the issues of whether to award com-
pensation and if so, how to determine the actual amount of com-
pensation to award to a requesting partner.
The importance of this change is predicated upon two factors:
(1) the current popularity of law firms organized as partner-
ships,' and (2) the increasing frequency with which partnerships
have divided or dissolved entirely. Although there is no accurate
tabulation concerning the actual number of law partnerships that
dissolve each year, it is sufficient to say that the number of
breakups has risen and has been accompanied by an increase in
publicity about law firm dissolutions."0
Law partnerships typically dissolve when the partners decide
that they no longer wish to continue to practice together as a
group." Some of the major reasons for firms dissolving are:
8. Leading cases defining the No Compensation Rule include: Jewel v. Boxer,
203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen,
194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 189-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Chazan v. Most, 25 Cal. Rptr. 864
(Cal. Ct. App. 1962); Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618 (D.C. 1990); Frates v.
Nichols, 167 So. 2d 77, 80-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485
N.E.2d 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Flynn v. Cohn, 607 N.E.2d 1236 (Ill. 1992); Resnick
v. Kaplan, 434 A.2d 582 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535
N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1989); Smith v. Daub, 365 N.W. 2d 816 (Neb. 1985); Kirsch v.
Leventhal, 586 N.Y.S.2d 330 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Platt v. Henderson, 361 P.2d 73
(Or. 1961); Gull v. Van Epps, 517 N.W.2d 531 (Wis. 1994). In addition, courts have
applied the No Compensation Rule to legal professional corporations. See Fox v.
Abrams, 210 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Sullivan, Bodney & Hammond v.
Bodney, 820 P.2d 1248 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991); Marr v. Langhoff, 589 A.2d 470 (Md.
1991).
9. In 1985, 53% of practicing attorneys practiced in firms comprised of two or
more lawyers. BARBARA A. CURRAN, ET AL., SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1985 4 (1986).
10. "It is indisputable that the last ten years have witnessed an explosion in
publicized law firm breakups." Laurel S. Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice
Consequences of Law Firm Breakups, 61 TEMP. L. Q. 1055, 1058 (1988). See also J.
William Callison, Partnership Law Issues in the Break-up and Dissolution of Law
Firms, 21 COLO. LAw. 409, 409 (1992).
11. Richard S. Green, Firm Dissolutions: Causes and Effects, in LAW FIRM
AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS 1988, at 167 (PLI Comm. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 475, 1988).
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1. dissension or lack of trust;
2. disagreement over firm management;
3. loss of business;
4. outside factors such as obtaining new financing, moving, 2 and
5. income distribution within the firm. 3
One of the difficulties that firms can encounter during the
dissolution process is the absence of a thoroughly drafted part-
nership agreement which envisions and clearly articulates what
will occur in the event of dissolution. In spite of the potential
difficulties associated with the lack of a written agreement, many
law firms organized as partnerships do not have a written part-
nership agreement." In fact, a significant percentage of firms
doing business as partnerships do so on the basis of an oral
agreement."6 Typically the partners may orally agree on part-
nership interests including the method of dividing liabilities and
profits (usually expressed in percentages).
However, even these more detailed oral agreements may not
deal with the prospect of dissolution. Accordingly, when dissolu-
tion does occur, the partners may find themselves at a loss in
determining how to resolve the situation.16 In such situations
the UPA, as adopted by all of the states except Louisiana, gov-
erns the results unless the parties have agreed otherwise. 7 The
RUPA continues this same practice of governing in the absence of
an agreement.8
In the absence of an agreement, under both the UPA and the
RUPA, dissolution is typically a two-step process. 9 The first
12. Green, cited at note 11, at 167.
13. Jeffrey L. Tolman, Why Partnerships Fail, 15 LEGAL ECON. 46 (1989),
14. See, e.g., Smith v. Daub, 365 N.W. 2d 816, 821 (Neb. 1985); Jewel v. Box-
er, 213 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that "contrary to the sound
legal advice they undoubtedly always gave their partnership clients, [the attorneys]
had no written partnership agreement"). See also Anthony L. Marks, Barefoot
Shoemakers: An Uncompromising Approach to Policing the Morals of the Marketplace
When Law Firms Split Up, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 509, 509 n.3 (1987).
15. Partnership agreements may be oral or implied from the conduct of the
parties. 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 2.13 (1994). See Boyd v. Walker, 251 So.2d 332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971); Missan v. Schoenfeld, 445 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App, Term. 1981).
16. When no partnership agreement exists or when it does not address dis-
solution matters, substantial legal issues may have to be resolved via litigation or
alternative dispute resolutidn. Callison, cited at note 10, at 409.
17. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18, 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969) (entitled "Rules
Determining the Rights and Duties of Partners," and stating that "[tihe rights and
duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to
any agreement between them, by the following rules").
18. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103 (1983).
19. Under the RUPA some confusion may arise between the use of the terms
Vol. 33:857
RUPA and Law Firm Dissolution
step involves the dissolution. Dissolution is defined as "the
change in the relation of the partners caused by any partner
ceasing to be associated in the carrying on . . . of the busi-
ness."" However, following the decision to dissolve, the partner-
ship continues until it completes the winding up of partnership
affairs.21 During this winding-up phase, the partners complete
the business of the partnership, liquidate assets, settle liabilities,
and distribute profits, if any, among the partners.22 As a result,
a partner's claim to income or profits does not terminate upon
the date of dissolution, but rather a partner has an interest in
income derived from the completion of the partnership's "unfin-
ished business." This concept of "unfinished business" typically
involves the completion of the firm's active cases.'
Accompanying a partner's interest in income derived from the
completion of the partnership's cases is the fiduciary duty of each
partner to wind up and complete the business of the partnership.
This interest and duty is often expressed as the "Unfinished
Business Rule." The Unfinished Business Rule expressly recog-
nizes that the decision to dissolve does not conclude or terminate
the fiduciary relationship of the parties, but rather it requires
that this relationship last until the winding up phase is complet-
"dissolution" and "dissociation." Under the RUPA, dissolution is a term used to signi-
fy the beginning of the winding up process. However, the term dissociation indicates
a change in relationship among the partners, similar to the definition of dissolution
under the UPA, such as a buy-out of a partner's interest or a termination and liqui-
dation of assets. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 801, 802. Further, under
the RUPA, the concept of dissociation includes a 90 day "cooling off" period before
the winding-up process begins. For thorough and interesting analyses concerning the
potential confusion in these terms see Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions
Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 427 (1991) and Arnold
M. Wensinger, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Breakup Provisions: Stability or
Headache?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 905 (1993). However, it is beyond the scope of
this Article to discuss this issue in further detail.
20. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 29, 6 U.L.A. 364 (1969).
21. When a partnership is dissolved it is not terminated, but it continues until
the affairs of the partnership have been wound up. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 30, 6
U.L.A., 367 (1969).
22. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40, 6 U.L.A. 468-69 (1969). See also note 28
and accompanying text.
23. The "unfinished business rule" derives from section 21(1) of the UPA. Sec-
tion 21(1) provides that profits or benefits derived from the unfinished business of a
partnership during the winding up period must be held in trust for the partnership,
without regard to how a partner came to complete the unfinished business and re-
ceive the associated profits. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 258
(1969); Rodney M. Confer & Cheryl R. Zwart, "Disintegrating Erosion" of Fiduciary
Duty in the Dissolution of a Partnership at Will, 70 NEB. L. REV. 107, 146-47 (1991).
See also Rosenfeld, Meyer, & Susman v. Cohen, 237 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987); Steeby v. Fial, 765 P.2d 1081 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Beckman v. Farmer, 579
A.2d 618 (D.C. 1990); Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485 N.E.2d 413 (111. App. Ct. 1985);
Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1266 (Mass. 1989).
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ed and the partnership is finally terminated.24
Included in a firm's assets are its active cases. These cases
may be based on a variety of fee agreements between the firm
and client. The typical fee agreements are either fixed fees (also
known as a flat amount fee), hourly rate fees, or contingent fees.
A contingent fee is an agreement between an attorney (or firm)
and client where the attorney (or firm) agrees to represent the
client for compensation based upon an agreed percentage of the
amount recovered.25 The particular problems arising from ongo-
ing contingent fee cases in dissolution and during the winding up
phase are whether they are to be considered an asset of the part-
nership,26 and if so, whether these cases have a present value at
the announced time of dissolution.27 A further problem is wheth-
er they are subject to the "winding up process,"' allocating an
amount of compensation to the partner who completes the case,
and dividing the fee within the dissolving partnership structure.
Because of the unique nature of contingent fees, if the case is not
successful and results in no affirmative judgment or settlement,
obviously there is no fee.29 Therefore, within the partnership
structure and during the dissolution process itself, the problem of
allocating the risk of no recovery arises. Also, the completion of
24. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21. According to section 21(1) of the Act, the
fiduciary duty continues during the winding up phase of the partnership. Id. See
generally 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 7.08 (1994); see also Leff v. Gunter, 658 P.2d 740, 744 (Cal. 1983);
Beckman, 579 A.2d at 636.
25. See Richard M. Birnholz, Comment, The Validity and Propriety of Contin-
gent Fee Controls, 37 UCLA L. REV. 949, 952 (1990).
26. There is authority on both sides of this issue. One line of cases indicates
that contingency fee cases are firm assets. See Kreutzer v. Wallace, 342 So. 2d 981
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Frates v. Nichols, 167 So. 2d 77, 80-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1964); Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977); Pellerin v. Pellerin, 550 So. 2d
1250 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Resnick v. Kaplan, 434 A.2d 582, 587 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1981); Dwyer v. Nicholson, 602 N.Y.S.2d 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Bader v. Cox,
701 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). Another line of cases has held that such cases
are not assets of the partnership. See, e.g., Aurnou v. Greenspan, 555 N.Y.S.2d 356
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
27. Some courts have held that due to the uncertainty of return in contingen-
cy fee arrangements no value can be assigned to them. See In re Marriage of Zells,
554 N.E.2d 289, 292 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Quinn v. Quinn, 575 A.2d 764, 769 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1990); Lamparski v. Sikov, Lamparski & Woncheck, 559 A.2d 544,
557 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
28. Winding up is defined as, "the process of settling partnership affairs after
dissolution." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 29 off. cmt., 6 U.LA. 635 (1969). The process
typically includes completing unfinished partnership work, selling partnership assets,
and collecting outstanding debts.
29. For an alternative explanation see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.5 (1983). The rule provides that if the client recovers nothing, there is
no fee paid to the attorney. Id.
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these cases can be protracted while still subject to the winding
up process.
The remainder of this Article is organized into three sections.
First, the justifications used to support the No Compensation
Rule are examined. Next, the criticisms of the No Compensation
Rule and the justifications for adopting the RUPA approach are
analyzed. Finally, a standard to be applied under the RUPA is
suggested.
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR UTILIZING THE No COMPENSATION RULE
In order to fully understand and evaluate the potential impact
of section 401(h) of the RUPA, it is critical to understand the No
Compensation Rule and its justifications as it has developed
under section 18(f) of the UPA. The No Compensation Rule pro-
vides that partners are not entitled to compensation for the wind-
ing up of the dissolved partnership beyond their partnership
interests for services rendered.0 An exception to the rule exists
where dissolution is caused by the death of a partner. 1 In such
a situation, the surviving partners are allowed compensation for
their efforts in winding up the partnership business."2 As was
stated earlier, section 401(h) of the RUPA would allow compensa-
tion at any time."3
Although application of the No Compensation Rule often yields
seemingly inequitable results,' courts have found various policy
reasons for applying it. These considerations have included: dis-
couraging battles over cases and possession of files, preserving
client choice, preserving freedom of contract, encouraging fiducia-
ry duties among partners, and promoting judicial economy.
Discourages Battles Over Cases
By prohibiting attorneys from receiving compensation in addi-
tion to their partnership interests, the No Compensation Rule
has the effect of discouraging partners from competing for control
over potentially lucrative cases."3 If partners are compensated
30. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(f). See note 8 for court decisions which have
defined the No Compensation Rule.
31. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(f).
32. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401(h) cmt. 8.
33. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401(h).
34. An inequitable result occurs when winding up burdens are not distributed
according to partnership interests; some partners are deprived while others receive a
windfall.
35. In the absence of such a rule a partner working on a potentially lucrative
contingency fee case may be tempted to dissolve the partnership and take the case
1995
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strictly on the basis of their partnership interest, there is no
financial incentive for them to battle during the lifetime of the
partnership over cases with foreseeably highly remunerative
results.
This rationale for applying the No Compensation Rule has
been cited in cases from various jurisdictions. In Kirsch v.
Leventhal"5 for instance, the New York Appellate Division
granted a withdrawing partner his partnership interest in a
contingency fee collected after the partnership had dissolved. 7
The court rejected one partner's contention that because the
lucrative case was a contingency fee case that had not been dis-
posed of before the partnership was dissolved, the withdrawing
partner was not entitled to his partnership share and was only
entitled to the quantum meruit value of the services he per-
formed on the case.' Granting the withdrawing partner his
partnership share of the realized contingency fee, the court rea-
soned that allowing extra compensation to the partner who com-
pleted the case would "encourage an unseemly and potentially
unethical battle ... . over the clients of the firm whose files have
the best prospects for an eventual lucrative recovery. ""
This reasoning was echoed by the California Court of Appeals
in Jewel v. Boxer.' In Jewel, a law partnership divided to form
two law firms.41 Cases which were unfinished at the time of the
original firm's dissolution were found to be assets of the original
firm and fees collected therefrom were disbursed according to the
original firm's partnership interests. 2 Justifying its denial of
quantum meruit recovery to the partners who completed the
cases, the court commended the No Compensation Rule for negat-
ing any incentive to compete for cases while the partnership was
a going concern so as to retain them in the event of dissolu-
tion.'
In addition to avoiding battles over potentially lucrative cases
during the lifetime of the partnership, the Jewel court concluded
that the No Compensation Rule "discourages former partners
from scrambling for possession of files and ... soliciting the
on his own so as not to share the profits of the case with his former partners.
36. 586 N.Y.S.2d 330 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
37. Kirsch, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 333.
40. 203 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
41. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 18-19. For an explanation of quantum meruit recovery, see note 93
and accompanying text.
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firm's existing clients upon dissolution."" The Jewel court also
asserted that the rule encouraged equitable distribution of wind-
ing up burdens.'
Adopting similar reasoning, the Illinois Court of Appeals in
Ellerby v. Spiezer" rejected granting former partners compensa-
tion in proportion to services rendered prior to dissolution. In
Ellerby a three member partnership dissolved with various con-
tingency fee cases pending.47 One former partner argued that
because the clients in the cases he was handling discharged the
partnership and retained him individually, he was entitled to the
entire fees from those cases, less a partnership claim for quant-
um meruit for services rendered prior to dissolution." The court,
however, found that abandoning the No Compensation Rule
would have the detrimental effect of encouraging the individual
partners to attempt to convince clients, with potentially highly
remunerative cases, to discharge the partnership and hire them
individually." The court explained that this sort of "case-chas-
ing" places clients exactly where they should not be: at the center
of a dispute among partners over monetary gain.54
In Fox v. Abrams,5 the California Court of Appeals applied
the No Compensation Rule and its rationale to law firm corpora-
tions.52 The court asserted that attorneys practicing together in
professional corporations owed each other fiduciary duties "very
similar to those owed by law partners," and therefore the fact
that a professional corporation was involved was no reason to
disregard the practice of splitting fees for work in progress at the
time of dissolution." The court noted that applying the rule of
Jewel was equitable to both interests and precluded the lawyers
from "scrambling" for existing cases as the law firm broke up.'
44. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
45. Id. at 19.
46. 485 N.E.2d 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
47. Ellerby, 485 N.E.2d at 415.
48. Id. at 416.
49. Id. at 417.
50. Id.
51. 210 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
52. Fox, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 265. For other cases applying the No Compensation
Rule to law firm professional corporations, see note 8 and accompanying text.
53. Fox, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 266.




Many courts have decided that the No Compensation Rule does
not impede client choice. Although opponents of the rule contend
that it results in clients being "locked-outs of their attorney of
choice, the court in Ellerby emphasized the fact that clients were
not restricted to being represented by any particular member of
the dissolved partnership."6 The court reasoned that the client's
right to select an attorney was separate and did not interfere
with the rights and duties between the partners regarding divi-
sion of profits resulting from unfinished partnership business. 7
Once the fee was paid to an attorney, it was not the client's con-
cern how the fee was disbursed among the partners. 8
Similarly, the court in Jewel found that the client's right to his
attorney of choice was distinct and did not conflict with the
rights and duties between partners with respect to income from
unfinished business.59 The court noted that the rule did not dis-
courage attorneys from representing former clients after dissolu-
tion because they would receive the same percentage of the fee as
if the firm had not dissolved.'c
Similarly, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in Resnick v.
Kaplan,1 upheld the No Compensation Rule.62 In Resnick, one
of five former law partners withdrew and continued to represent
various clients which he had represented prior to dissolution.'
The withdrawing partner contended that he alone was entitled to
the fees because it was his clients' choice to continue to be repre-
sented by him." The court, however, disagreed and held that
the client's absolute right to the attorney of his choice did not
prevent the fees earned by the chosen partner from being divided
among the former partners."
55. See Mark H. Epstein & Brandon Wisoff, Comment, Winding Up Dissolved
Law Partnerships: The No-compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1597, 1599 (1985) (using the term "lock out" to describe the phenomenon which
occurs when partners dissolve in good' faith but are unable or unwilling to continue
representing a client post-dissolution because the amount of work involved in the
representation would be vastly disproportionate to their compensation).
56. Ellerby, 485 N.E.2d at 416.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
60. Id. at 16-19.
61. 434 A.2d 582 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
62. Resnick, 434 A.2d at 587.
63. Id. at 585.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 588.
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Preserves Judicial Economy
A significant advantage of the No Compensation Rule is its
practicality due to its mechanical application. In implementing
the rule, courts need not examine the dissolution process on an
ad hoc basis to determine the fee proportion owed to each part-
ner.6" The automatic application of the No Compensation Rule
by courts also encourages private dispute resolution. Abandoning
the rule in favor of quantum meruit compensation would force
courts to examine, weigh, and formulate various factors to deter-
mine the amount of compensation owed to former partners.
Courts would have to determine what percentage of the fee was
accrued before and after dissolution, the expected value of the
case, and how much time the partner actually spent working on
the case.
Encourages the Fiduciary Duty Among Partners
Section 21 of the UPA defines the partners' fiduciary duty as
accounting for any benefit derived without the consent of the
other partners from a "transaction connected with the formation,
conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him
of its property." 7 The main elements comprising the fiduciary
duty within a partnership are utmost good faith, fairness, and
loyalty." Although a problem arises in determining the precise
delineation of the scope of the duty, especially as it impacts on
the reasons for terminating a law partnership, case law has been
helpful in elaborating on the general parameters of the fiduciary
duty. 9
66. See Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19.
67. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21. According to courts that have interpreted
section 21(1), the fiduciary duty continues during the winding up phase of the part-
nership. See Leff v. Gunter, 658 P.2d 740, 744 (Cal. 1983).
68. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, cited at note 15, § 6.07.
69. In trying to define "good faith" as it applies to the decision to dissolve,
two general schools of thought have developed. The first, set forth in a line of Cali-
fornia decisions, applies a good faith standard to a partner's withdrawal decision.
See, e.g., Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1961) (indicating that there is liability
for partners who act in bad faith to cause dissolution); see also Rosenfeld, Meyer &
Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 188 (1983) (finding that law partners do not
have the right to dissolve in bad faith). Bad faith in Rosenfeld was defined as exist-
ing when the decision to dissolve results in a transfer of ongoing partnership busi-
ness to the withdrawing partner. See Rosenfeld, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 188-90.
The second school of thought concentrates more on the procedure and process
employed by a partner in his decision to withdraw. See, e.g., Meehan v.
Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1262 (Mass. 1989) (finding no breach of fiduciary
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The fiduciary duty is two-fold. First, the UPA requires part-
ners to account to the partnership, and second, it delineates the
duties between partners." Partners deal with each other in con-
nection with partnership business as fiduciaries. Just as the
partner is held to a high standard of loyalty when presented with
a partnership opportunity, likewise the partner is held to an
equally strict standard in transactions with the firm or co-part-
ners.
71
Property belonging to the partnership is to be used by the
partners for partnership, rather than for individual purposes.
Section 21(1) of the UPA provides that any benefit derived by a
partner from acquisition or use of partnership property without
co-partner consent must be shared with the other partners. 2
Unauthorized benefits from partnership property for which the
partner must account include taking over a partnership con-
tract. 3 Section 21(1) of the UPA makes clear that the fiduciary
duties exist during the normal operation of the partnership as
well as during the winding-up period.74 A partner must not take
partnership property after dissolution. Partnership property
includes a law firm's case that is in progress before dissolution,
and is completed as part of the winding up of the firm.75 This
means that winding up continues as long as there are outstand-
ing cases. Further, because the withdrawing partner is account-
able to others as a fiduciary and a misappropriation of partner-
ship income is actionable, there is great disincentive to "grab."'
duty in the decision to dissolve even when dissolving partners had a secret plan to
compete with former firm, but the court found a breach in the manner in which the
dissolving partners took clients from the partnership). Under the UPA, unless other-
wise agreed, law firm partnerships are considered to be "at will" and as such, the
decision to dissolve typically requires no justification. See Stainton v. Tarantino, 637
F.Supp. 1051 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Girard Bank v. Haley, 332 A.2d 443 (Pa. 1975).
70. BROMBERG & .RIBSTEIN, cited at note 15, § 6.72.
71. See Creswel v. Keith, 361 S.W.2d 542 (Ark. 1962); Malden Trust Co. v.
Brooks, 177 N.E. 629 (Mass. 1931); Penner v. De Nike, 285 N.W. 33 (Mich. 1939).
72. UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21 (1969).
73. Rosenfeld, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 189-90.
74. Id at 190.
75. Id. at 189-90. See also Bracht v. Connell, 170 A. 297 (Pa. 1933).
76. The term "grabbing" derives from Professor Hillman's article and is used
to refer to a partner's taking of clients from his former firm. See Robert W.
Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of Grabbing and
Leaving, 67 TEx L. REV. 1, 4 n.ll (1988). UPA section 21(1) emphasizes the fact
that the fiduciary duty carries over into the winding-up phase of a partnership. See
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21(1). The RUPA does not depart from this concept. See
REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 404(a)-(c) (1993). Courts have emphasized that
the partners' fiduciary duties continue until the windup was completed. See Fox v.
Abrams, 210 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Cal Ct. App. 1985); Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618 (D.C. 1990); Ellerby v.
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In Ellerby, the court held that as a part of a partner's fiduciary
duty with regard to unfinished partnership business, he had to
"wind it up and complete it for the partnership."77 The court
noted that he was not entitled to take any course of action re-
garding the unfinished business that led solely to personal gain,
such as having the client terminate the partnership and retain
him individually.7" In Frates v. Nichols,79 following the dissolu-
tion of the law firm, one withdrawing partner took several con-
tingency fee cases with him to his practice." The departing at-
torney argued that because he brought the cases into the part-
nership and he completed the cases after dissolution, his former
partners were not entitled to any share of the fees realized."
The court disagreed, and held that a law partner in dissolution
owed a duty to his former firm to wind up the former firm's
pending business, and that he was not entitled to any additional
compensation."s
The court in Kirsch v. Leventhal' cited a similar rationale for
denying compensation. The court contended that limiting a with-
drawing partner's interest in contingent fee cases pending at the
time of dissolution to the quantum meruit value of that partner's
services performed on the cases was inconsistent with the fidu-
ciary duty of the partner in possession of the post-dissolution
business to wind up and complete performance for the benefit of
all partners." As a result, a strict application of the No Com-
pensation Rule encourages compliance with the fiduciary duty
among partners. Because all partners are under a duty to wind
up the affairs of the partnership, the No Compensation Rule
successfully ensures that the burdens of completing firm business
are distributed equally.'
Spiezer, 485 N.E.2d 413 (Il. App. Ct. 1985); Smith v. Daub, 365 N.W.2d 816 (Neb.
1985); see also BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, cited at note 15, § 7.08.
77. Eflerby, 485 N.E.2d at 416.
78. Id. at 416-17.
79. 167 So. 2d 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
80. Frates, 167 So. 2d at 79.
81. Id. at 80-81.
82. Id. at 80.
83. 586 N.Y.S.2d 330 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
84. Kirsch, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 333; see also Resnick v. Kaplan, 434 A.2d 582
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); Smith v. Daub, 365 N.W.2d 816 (Neb. 1985); Platt v.
Henderson, 361 P.2d 73 (Or. 1961); Walker v. Goodrich, 16 Ill. 341 (1855); Shelly v.
Smith, 170 N.E. 826 (Mass. 1930).
85. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
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Preserves Freedom of Contract
Proponents of the No Compensation Rule maintain that the
rule preserves the former partners' freedom of contract. The risk
that fees will not be divided exactly in proportion to dissolution
burdens is voluntarily assumed by partners when they do not
provide for fee disbursement in their agreement. Partners have
the freedom to draft their partnership agreements in a way
which ensures that dissolution yields appropriate results.
The court in Jewel expressed that any inequitable results
which stemmed from the application of the No Compensation
Rule had to be borne by the former partners as a consequence of
their failure to provide for dissolution in their original agree-
ment.86 The court noted that partners were in the position to
define their own relationships at the onset of formation, therefore
partners were accountable for their inability to draft a provision
to provide for more equitable results.s7
Similarly, in the case of Berkson v. Berryman," the court de-
nied compensation to a former partner despite the fact that he
did most of the work on the cases before, during, and after the
partnership existed. The Berkson court stated that:
[Tihe partnership was short-lived.., the parties are mutually bound to
the contractual and legal rights and obligations which arose by reason of
the formation of the partnership. They are likewise bound by the mutual
rights and obligations which exist either by contract or partnership law
upon dissolution and in connection with the winding up of the
partnership. 9
Also, when a firm decides to accept a contingency fee case, it is
a partnership decision. Therefore, all partners should understand
the risk, and expect that recovery should not be changed as a
result of compensation awarded during the dissolution process.'
Moreover, results of post-dissolution cases may actually be the
product or a combination of: pre-dissolution efforts, fortuitous
results, and efforts of a different partner, i.e. a partner who
86. Id.
87. See Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20; see also Jacobson v. Wikholm, 172 P.2d
878, 880 (Cal. 1946); Beckman, 579 A.2d at 626.
88. 488 A.2d 504 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
89. Berkson, 488 A.2d at 512. See also Kreutzer v. Wallace, 342 So.2d 981,
982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (applying the No Compensation Rule because the
partners' agreement failed to provide for extra compensation for winding up cases
after dissolution).
90. See Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20; see also La Mantia v. Durst, 561 A.2d
275, 279 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
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brought a case/client to the firm.91 For instance, if partners are
sharing partnership income, those working on non-contingency
cases may be "supporting" the contingency case partners between
recoveries. These types of partnership "arrangements" should be
recognized by the courts and not be discounted at the time of
dissolution.
CRITICISM OF THE No COMPENSATION RULE AND THE
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ADOPTING THE RUPA APPROACH
The UPA's No Compensation Rule has been subject to some
criticism. Despite the advantages discussed in the previous sec-
tion, the mechanical application of the rule has been criticized for
various reasons. Among these are its potential for yielding ineq-
uitable results, that it may encourage "bad faith" dissolution,
that it may cause client "lock-out" (i.e. undermine client choice)
and attorney "lock-in" (i.e. force dissatisfied partners to stay to-
gether), and that it may have the effect of limiting freedom of
contract.92 These results are the very opposite of its purported
advantages.
Despite the policies cited by courts to justify their adherence to
the No Compensation Rule, a few courts have declined to apply
it. These courts have retained the UPA's doctrine of unfinished
business but have allowed compensation to the winding up part-
ner in the form of quantum meruit recovery where it was neces-
sary to prevent inequitable results."
Section 401(h) is squarely aimed at answering the criticisms of
the No Compensation Rule under the current UPA approach. It
attempts to curb the inequitable results sometimes caused by the
mechanical application of the No Compensation Rule. It further
tries to discourage bad faith dissolution, while at the same time,
preserves client choice and the partners' freedom of contract.
91. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, cited at note 15, § 7.08.
92. See Epstein & Wisoff, cited at note 55, at 1615-19.
93. See Denver v. Roane, 99 U.S. 355, 358 (1878); Jacobson v. Wikholm, 172
P.2d 878, 879-80 (Cal. 1946); Champion v. Superior Court, 247 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Jones v. Marshall, 135 P. 841, 842 (Idaho 1913); In re Mondale
& Johnson, 437 P.2d 636, 641 (Mont. 1969); Lamb v. Wilson, 92 N.W. 167, 168
(Neb. 1902); Bracht v. Connell, 170 A. 297, 300 (Pa. 1933); Cofer v. Hearne, 459
S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970). Compensation may be a function of: 1) the
amount of work done in excess of that done by the other partners and 2) the ex-
pected value of the extra work as of the date of dissolution. See Epstein & Wisoff,
cited at note 55, at 1621.
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Difficulties in Applying the No Compensation Rule to Law Firm
Partnerships
Much has been written with respect to the existence of certain
difficulties in applying the dissolution rules and specifically, the
No Compensation Rule, to law firm partnerships.' It has been
described pointedly as fitting a "square peg in a round hole."95
The major difficulty stems from the fundamental differences
between a commercial partnership whose assets consist of goods
and services, and a professional service partnership like a law
firm whose major assets consist of on-going client cases. 6 Un-
like a commercial partnership, liquidating assets in a law firm
may take a long period of time.9" In addition, the UPA presumes
the winding up period to be a cooperative venture. However,
dissolving law firms are often hindered by the strained relations
between the partners during the winding up process.98
In addition, the relationship with clients makes law firm part-
nerships unique, for unlike a commercial enterprise, the on-going
cases of a law firm (executory contracts) cannot be sold or as-
signed to another law firm.9 Also, the winding-up burdens im-
posed on an individual law firm partner during dissolution may
be arbitrary. The degree of burden depends on several possibili-
ties, including initial case assignment, area of specialization, and
redistribution of caseload either prior to dissolution or at the
time of dissolution.' ° These differences are exaggerated by dis-
proportionate winding up burdens coupled with the prohibition
against extra compensation.
The RUPA's approach should alleviate this major difficulty. To
the extent that partners in the dissolving firm contribute equally
during the winding up phase, no extra compensation for a part-
ner would be required. However, where the winding up burdens
are disproportionate among the partners, the courts would be
authorized to award extra compensation.
94. See, e.g., Hillman, cited at note 76; Marks, cited at note 14, at 514.
95. See Marks, cited at note 14, at 514.
96. Id. at 514-15 n.41 (listing opinions indicating that on-going cases are as-
sets of a law firm and are defined as "unfinished business" of the firm).
97. Marks, cited at note 14, at 515.
98. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 184-86 (a classic
example of how strained these relationships can become).
99. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(B) and MODEL
RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2(c).
100. Epstein & Wisoff, cited at note 55, at 1612.
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Curbing Inequitable Results
Some courts have rejected the No Compensation Rule and
criticized it for the appalling results it sometimes produces.'0 '
In some situations application of this rule may deny an attorney
the benefits of his or her labor, while allowing a windfall to one
of the partners who shouldered a relatively light burden during
the winding up phase. In order to avoid this inequity, courts have
allowed a quantum meruit recovery for the partner who per-
formed a disproportionate winding up burden where granting an
enormous fee to a former partner (based on his percentage of
ownership of the firm) without any relationship to services ren-
dered seemed blatantly unfair and unconscionable.0 2 Awarding
compensation to partners with comparatively heavy winding-up
burdens would rectify this problem. Thus a partner who puts in
substantially more work than the other former partners in the
winding-up process would be reasonably compensated for his toil,
thereby curbing the unjust result that would otherwise ensue.
Discouraging "Bad Faith" Dissolution
Although the No Compensation Rule purports to discourage
partners from "grabbing and leaving,"0 3 it may actually have
the effect of encouraging them to dissolve when their winding up
duties would be light in comparison to those of other partners.
That is, when a partner finds himself in a position in which his
winding up burdens would be relatively slight, he may opt to
dissolve the partnership and thus reap the benefits of his
partners' labor.
Because of this possibility, some courts have subjected a
partner's decision to dissolve to a good faith standard."' This
makes the consequences of dissolution uncertain and thus deters
grabbing and leaving. It is unclear whether the No Compensation
Rule adds any deterrent to grabbing and leaving which is not
already present via the fiduciary duties among partners.0
101. See, e.g., Cofer, 459 S.W.2d at 879-80.
102. See, e.g., Cofer, 459 S.W.2d at 879-80.
103. See note 76 and accompanying text discussing "grabbing."
104. See note 69.
105. The No Compensation Rule emphasizes discouraging grabbing and leaving
to the exclusion of other policy goals. This may be unwarranted because it is un-
clear that strict adherence to the unfinished business doctrine adds a deterrent that
is not already there (i.e., to dissolve in order to capture the benefits of lucrative
cases yields liability for breach of fiduciary duty.) See Epstein & Wisoff, cited at
note 55, at 1633.
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That is, if a partner provokes dissolution in order to capture the
benefits of lucrative cases, he will be in breach of his fiduciary
duty. This breach will render him liable for bad faith dissolu-
tion."'6 Therefore, there is a great disincentive to dissolve in
bad faith. Arguably, the No Compensation Rule does not enhance
this existing deterrent.
By granting partners compensation for disproportionate work
performed in the winding up process, the RUPA Section 401(h)
eliminates the financial incentive for dissolving the partnership
when one partner's burdens are substantially lighter than
another's. That is, because a partner with substantially greater
winding up burdens would be compensated for his or her efforts,
it would not encourage partners with relatively lighter burdens
to dissolve as an attempt to capture the fruits of their former
partner's labor.
Preserving Client Choice
When law partnerships dissolve, clients do not see attorneys as
fungible. To effectuate the goal of preserving client choice, part-
ners at times will be required to take on unequal winding up
burdens. The No Compensation Rule claims to preserve the post-
dissolution right of the client to be represented by his attorney of
choice. Courts which have adhered to the rule reason that the
client's right to his attorney of choice is distinct and does not
offend the duties among partners concerning income generated
by winding up the partnership. °7
However, critics argue that the No Compensation Rule may
render the client's attorney of choice unwilling or unable to con-
tinue representing the client because his compensation would be
vastly disproportionate to the work required to wind up."8 Be-
cause the rule may force the partners to reallocate cases, a client
is effectively "locked out" of retaining his attorney of choice. 10 9
106. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 188
(1983) (finding that law partners do not have the right to dissolve in bad faith). Bad
faith in Rosenfeld was defined as existing when the decision to dissolve results in a
transfer of ongoing partnership business to the withdrawing partner. See Rosenfeld,
194 Cal. Rptr. at 188-190.
107. See, e.g., Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1262 (Mass. 1989)
(finding no breach of fiduciary duty in the decision to dissolve even when dissolving
partners had a secret plan to compete with former firm, but the court found a
breach in the manner in which the dissolving partners took clients from the partner-
ship).
108. See Epstein & Wisoff, cited at note 55, at 1618-19; Hillman, cited at note
76, at 4.
109. The term "Lock-out" refers to the situation in which a disenchanted part-
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In this way, critics emphasize that it is the client who suffers the
brunt of the No Compensation Rule.1 ' By not allowing compen-
sation for work performed, the client's chosen attorney has little
incentive to continue working on that case. The No Compensation
Rule discourages representation by the client's attorney of choice,
as former partners will not want to perform all post-dissolution
work for only a portion of the income they have generated."'
Although clients contract for the services of the partnership,
their expectation is that one particular partner who is familiar
with the case will be responsible for the handling and completion
of the matter. When cases are reassigned at dissolution because
it is not feasible for the partner working on the case to continue,
the client's freedom to choose is undermined.
The phenomenon of "lock out" can be avoided by the RUPA
Section 401(h). The financial disincentive of completing a particu-
lar client's contingent fee case which requires a disproportionate
amount of time and effort, is eliminated by awarding compensa-
tion to an attorney who has excessive winding up burdens.
Preserving Freedom of Contract
Courts utilizing the No Compensation Rule have emphasized
that it preserves freedom of contract by forcing parties to abide
by their partnership agreements."' As the court noted in Jewel,
the rule only comes into play when the partners fail to provide
for dissolution fee division in their agreement."' However, crit-
ics of the rule argue that it actually defeats freedom of contract
by encroaching upon the at-will partnership for which the part-
ners contracted."'
The adoption of the RUPA Section 401(h) may alleviate this
situation. By allowing compensation, dissatisfied partners with
relatively burdensome winding up duties will remain free to
dissolve the partnership. That is, the financial disincentive for
ner dissolves the partnership in good faith but is not willing or able to continue
with the representation of one of his former clients because the amount of work
involved in the representation is significantly disproportionate to the compensation
he would receive. Epstein & Wisoff, cited at note 55, at 1599. This unwillingness to
continue representation may have the effect of "locking" the client out of having his
interests pursued by his lawyer of choice, the attorney most familiar with his case.
110. Epstein & Wisoff, cited at note 55, at 1599.
111. See Champion, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 627 (noting that, "[wihen an attorney re-
mains willing and able to represent a client, representation should not be barred by
an unconscionable partnership agreement with former partners").
112. See, .e.g., Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 17-19.
113. Id.
114. See Epstein & Wisoff, cited at note 55, at 1610-11.
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dissolving will be removed. With the disincentive removed, part-
nerships will remain viable as long as there exists a sound eco-
nomic basis for all of the partners to continue. It may also force
law firms to become more sensitive to issues of partner compen-
sation and to encourage a periodic examination of their existing
compensation plans.
In essence, the No Compensation Rule may lock dissatisfied
partners into their original partnership by forcing them to stay
together in a situation where their winding-up burdens would be
too disproportionate to render dissolution feasible." 5 Freedom
of contract would be enhanced by allowing partners wishing to
dissolve to exercise their right to do so without fearing vastly
unequal distribution of winding up burdens.
Cases Which Have Allowed Compensation
Although many courts have applied the UPA's No Compensa-
tion Rule in situations where the partnership agreement did not
provide for the allocation of post-dissolution fees, a few courts
have declined to apply it. These courts have used some of the
above mentioned criticisms to justify their rejection of the rule in
favor of granting quantum meruit compensation. These courts
have emphasized the distinction between professional partner-
ships and other types of partnerships. Some courts have held
that where the profits of the partnership derive solely from the
professional skill and labor of the partners, compensation should
be awarded."' These cases provide further justification for the
adoption of the RUPA Section 401(h).
Compensating a Surviving Partner
As discussed earlier, the UPA makes an exception for dissolu-
tion due to the death of a partner. This exception was created
because the death of a partner necessarily leaves the entire bur-
den of winding up upon the surviving partner(s), a situation
which would not ordinarily occur if all the partners were alive
and participating in the partnership."7 The fact that the UPA
allows this exception demonstrates recognition of the potential
115. The concept of "lock-in" refers to the situation in which a partner wants to
dissolve a partnership at will but is prevented from doing so because of thet econom-
ic disincentive that may exist when winding up burdens are disproportionately dis-
tributed among partners. See Epstein & Wisoff, cited at note 55, at 1610-11.
116. See, e.g., Lamb, 92 N.W. at 168.
117. See Chazan, 25 Cal. Rptr, at 867. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, cited at
note 15, §§ 7.08(d), 7:79-7:80.
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inequities of the No Compensation Rule.'18 Even prior to the
UPA's enactment, some courts allowed surviving partners to
receive compensation in excess of their proportionate partnership
interests." 9
Compensation in Non-Death Dissolution Cases
Some courts have applied the rationale for compensating a
surviving partner to dissolutions which were not caused by the
death of one of the partners. For instance, in Lamb v. Wilson,"'
a three-member partnership dissolved, leaving two of the attor-
neys with all of the burdens of winding up one of the former
partnership's contingency fee cases.'2 ' In deciding not to apply
the No Compensation Rule, the court held that the rule should
not be extended beyond the requirement of merely winding up
partnership affairs.'22 That is, it should not be extended to col-
lecting a partnership's outstanding claims, paying debts, or dis-
tributing profits." The court reasoned that when it appears
that time, skill, and labor have been expended by a partner in
the continuance of the partnership business, he ought to be com-
pensated for the profits he generates according to the nature of
the business, the difficulties and results of the undertaking, and
its necessity or desirability."4
Like the Lamb court, in Bracht v. Connell".. the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court allowed special compensation to partners who
performed services in excess of their winding up duties.' In
Bracht, prior to dissolution, two partners in the three-member
firm procured a contract under the partnership name and pro-
ceeded to do all of the work involved in settling that case.'27
The court found that the services rendered in completing that
case exceeded merely winding up the affairs of the partner-
ship. "'28 The court granted the two partners compensation deter-
mined by the fair value of the services and by considering the
118. Jacobson v. Wikholm, 172 P.2d 878, 879-80 (Cal. 1946).
119. See Jacobson, 172 P.2d at 879; Denver v. Roane, 99 U.S. 355, 358 (1878);
Jones v. Marshall, 135 P. 841, 842 (Idaho 1913); In re Mondale & Johnson, 437 P.2d
636, 640-41 (Mont. 1969).
120. 92 N.W. 167 (Neb. 1902).
121. Lamb, 92 N.W. at 168.
122. Id. at 169.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 170 A. 297 (Pa. 1933).
126. Bracht, 170 A. at 300.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 300.
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nature of the work done, time spent, and skill used."
Similarly, the court in Cofer v. Hearne3 ' held that a law
partner who does legal work on partnership business after the
voluntary dissolution of the partnership was entitled to extra
compensation for his work."'1 In Cofer a three member law
partnership dissolved leaving a number of its cases
unfinished."2 The court disagreed with two of the firm's part-
ners who argued that the fees collected from matters which came
to the firm prior to dissolution were partnership assets to be
equally divided regardless of when or by which partner the work
was completed.'33 Instead, the court granted extra compensa-
tion to the former partner who completed the work on the mat-
ter, stating, "we cannot bring ourselves to the voluntary accep-
tance of a rule which is unconscionable and inequitable.""
Although Champion v. Superior Court"' dealt with a part-
nership agreement, the court's decision was founded on some of
the same policies which support granting compensation when no
agreement exists.3 6 In Champion, the court criticized a part-
nership agreement which did not provide for compensation to a
withdrawing partner for causing a deprivation of the client's
freedom to choose.' 7 Despite its reluctance to interfere with
partnership agreements, the court asserted that public policy
required the protection of the interests of the former
partnership's clients. 3 '
The court further reasoned that while the client was free to
choose the representation of the withdrawing partner, that repre-
sentation could be effectively denied by prohibiting the withdraw-
ing partner from getting reasonable compensation.3 9 By failing
to compensate the withdrawing partner, the client was deprived
of the attorney most familiar with his case and most desired by
him. 40 The Champion court concluded that the No Compensa-
tion Rule was unconscionable, "when a sizeable fee is granted
without any relationship to services rendered, it must shock the
129. Id.
130. 459 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970).
131. Cofer, 459 S.W.2d at 879.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 880.
135. 247 Cal. Rptr. 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
136. Id. at 627. The Champion court emphasized that the financial disincentives
of the No Compensation Rule worked to the detriment of client choice. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 627-28.
139. Id.
140. Champion, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
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conscience of lawyers of ordinary prudence practicing in the com-
munity."
1 4 1
SUGGESTED STANDARD TO BE APPLIED UNDER THE RUPA
After examining the strengths and weaknesses of the No Com-
pensation Rule, several observations need to be made. First,
where partners in a dissolving law firm have contractually ad-
dressed the issue of how to compensate partners for work per-
formed during the winding up phase, including the allocation of
contingent fees, courts should uphold the stated will of the part-
ners."2 Nothing in the RUPA would indicate otherwise.
Second, where the dissolving partners have no agreement, the
RUPA would control. However, when confronted with the issue of
compensation for partners during the winding up phase, there
seems to be no one test or proposal that fairly takes into account
the needs of the dissolving partnership, the dissolving partners
as individuals (especially those who perform a disproportionate
amount of work), or the partnership's clients.
When faced with these circumstances and competing interests,
a court should adopt a balancing approach using the following set
of factors to determine whether to award compensation and to
calculate the actual amount of compensation to award an individ-
ual partner:
1. The partner's percentage interest in the dissolving law firm;
2. The amount of time spent on a contingency fee case by a partner,
including the use of a time ratio expressed as a percentage based upon
the amount of time reasonably spent on the case prior to the decision to
dissolve and the amount of time spent during the winding up phase;
3. The amount of work performed by the partner seeking compensation
during the winding up phase in relation to the amount of work per-
formed by the other partners; and
4. The costs incurred, including reasonable overhead expenses and costs
advanced on behalf of a client, by both the dissolving partnership and a
partner who completes the case during the winding up period.
141. Id.
142. See Thomas v. Marvin E. Jewell & Co., 440 N.W.2d 437 (Neb. 1989)
(holding that a partnership agreement in effect at dissolution controls division of
profits/losses); see also Stacker & Ravich v. Simon, 411 N.W.2d 217 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987).
143. Although quantum meruit has been used as a method of compensation,
typically the primary focus is on time spent by the partner before and after dissolu-
tion. See, e.g., Cofer, 459 S.W.2d at 877. Further, although the compensation model
proposed by Epstein and Wisoff does take into account some of these factors, the
method articulated for allocating the risk of expectancy is unrealistic and unwork-
able. See Epstein & Wisoff, cited at note 55, at 1622.
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Examined together, these factors provide for a more thorough
analysis than any one component alone. In fact, courts are well
experienced in using this type of approach. In divorce law, for
example, in the area of equitable distribution of marital property,
many states have promulgated a list of factors that a court is
required to examine in reaching its decision as to the allocation
of marital property (or its equivalent value).'" In addition, giv-
en the benefit of hindsight in applying this set of criteria, a court
can accurately assess the degree of difficulty and risk involved in
a given case.
The clients' interests should be served by this approach. By
providing an economic incentive that is proportionate to the work
load of all of the dissolving partners, and yet recognizing the
special skill and energy necessary to bring a case to a successful
result, the economic disincentive to complete a case unrewarded
is eliminated. As a result, a client can continue to be represented
by the attorney of her choice with whom she has developed a
relationship of trust until the case is ultimately resolved. In
essence, the dissolution of the law firm becomes a non-economic
issue for the client.
Determination of Partner's Interest in the Dissolving Law Firm
This factor is fairly easy to ascertain. The court is required to
ascertain the percentage interest for each partner. This continues
the practice articulated by courts implementing the No Compen-
144. Factors or criteria typically used in the equitable distribution process are:
a) length of marriage; b) any prior marriage of either party; c) the age, health, sta-
tion, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate liabilities
and needs of each party; d) the contribution by one party to the education, training,
or increased earning power of the other party; e) the opportunity of each party for
future acquisitions of capital assets and income; f) the sources of income of both
parties, included but not limited to medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits;
g) the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, de-
preciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a
party as homemaker; h) the value of the property set apart to each party; i) the
standard of living of the parties established during the marriage; j) the economic
circumstances of each party, including federal, state and local tax ramifications, at
the time the division of property is to become effective; and k) whether the party
will be serving as the custodian of any dependent minor children. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (1994); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 750 para. 5/503 (1994); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.190 (Baldwin 1994); MD. CODE ANN. § 8-205 (1994); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 722-A (West 1994); MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1994); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-4-202 (1993); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 34-23.1 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-
365 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171 (Anderson 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §
3502 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-5-16.1 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-472 (Law.
Co-op 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Michie
1994); WYO. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1994).
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sation Rule and should present no new difficulty.
Calculating Reasonable Time Spent on a Case in Terms of a
Ratio of Reasonable Time Spent Prior to Dissolution and During
the Winding Up Period
This factor is similar to the quantum meruit approach. Courts
should examine the amount of time spent by a partner prior to
the decision to dissolve, and that amount of time spent during
the winding-up phase. By including the concept of "reasonable
time spent" courts can examine whether the time claimed to have
been spent was reasonable in light of the complexity of the
case.1" By examining time records the court can determine the
nature of the work done and the extent to which time might have
been spent on trivial matters. In addition, by examining time
records, the court can make a finding as to whether work was de-
liberately postponed by a partner until after the decision to dis-
solve was made in the hopes of trying to "grab" a larger portion
of the fee. Further, this examination allows the court to assess
the amount of risk involved in gaining a successful result that
was assumed by the partnership. For example, a difficult or high
risk case would be treated differently from a case that should
have been relatively easy to successfully conclude.
The Amount of Work Performed by the Partner Seeking
Compensation During the Winding Up Phase in Relation to Work
Performed by the Other Partners
This factor addresses one of the major inequities of the No
Compensation Rule. By examining the proportionate work load of
each partner during the winding up phase, a court can accurately
determine whether any disproportion exists. A partner who puts
forth a significant amount of time and energy in only one case
can be treated differently from a partner who has many such
cases. In addition, a partner-who only has one case, but which is
high risk and eventually results in no recovery, is not penalized
for the time he has put into the case. The time spent in an un-
successful case can still be measured against those cases complet-
ed by the other partners. In essence, the allocation of the risk of
losing is spread out among the partners. In addition, the finan-
cial reward potentially reaped in any case is placed in relative
145. See McLean v. Michaelousky, 458 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1983) (applying a "reasonable value of work rule" to apportion a fee between a firm
and a former associate who continued to work on the case alone).
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context with the other cases handled by the dissolving partners.
This factor also allows the courts to acknowledge the partner
who spends far more time than others in completing contingent
fee cases during the winding up phase. Courts would now be
authorized to compensate such a partner for the services ren-
dered.
The Amount of Costs Incurred, Including Reasonable Overhead
Expenses and Costs Advanced on Behalf of a Client by Both the
Dissolving Partnership and a Partner Who Completes the Case
During the Winding Up Period
Under the existing case law based on Section 18(f) of the UPA,
courts have been divided on the issue of whether the allocation of
winding up income may be adjusted to reflect overhead expens-
es. "'46 When reasonable overhead expenses have been awarded it
has been coupled with the denial of extra compensation to a
partner for work performed during the winding up phase of the
partnership dissolution.'47 In order to avoid calling the award of
overhead expenses "compensation," the courts treated the
overhead attributable to the winding up of partnership business
as a liability to the partnership.4 ' Accordingly, prior to the dis-
tribution of profits, each partner was entitled to be reimbursed
for the overhead expenses attributable to winding up the partner-
ship.149 In essence, the award of reimbursable overhead expens-
es was used as a method to avoid some of the inequities that
might exist due to the mechanical implementation of the No
Compensation Rule.
The Jewel court concluded that expenses such as office staff
salaries, rent and library costs could be included as overhead
expenses."5° Therefore, the partner seeking reimbursement for
these types of expenses should bear the burden of establishing
what expense items are chargeable to the unfinished business
completed during the winding up phase.' Obviously, a partner
seeking reimbursement must keep careful records.
146. See Ellerby, 485 N.E.2d at 413; see also Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20
(allowing reimbursement of overhead expenses); Hawksworth v. Ponzoli, 388 So.2d
299, 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (denying reimbursement because of a strict and
literal interpretation of the No Compensation Rule disallowing any extra compensa-
tion).
147. See Ellerby, 485 N.E.2d at 413; Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
148. See Ellerby, 485 N.E.2d at 413.
149. Id.
150. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
151. See Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983).
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Flynn v. Cohen"' represents a different approach used by a
court to allocate overhead expenses during the winding up peri-
od. The court approved a formula which was weighted by the
number of months cases handled by each partner in the winding
up period were pending.'55 The court asserted that partners
who handled the case after dissolution would be reimbursed for
the other partner's share of the overhead incurred after dissolu-
tion. '54
Either methodology expressed above could be used by a court
in determining a fair allocation of overhead expenses. Moreover,
in the absence of adequate record keeping, the formula approach
could be utilized if a court was so inclined to award reimburse-
ment.
The issue of reimbursing costs advanced on behalf of the client
must also be addressed. The advancement of client costs should
be reimbursed to either the partnership or the dissolving partner,
whichever or whomever actually advanced the funds.
Critics might claim that the standard offered by this Article
might increase litigation and thereby thwart the goal of judicial
economy. However, judicial economy is not sacrificed for two
reasons. First, courts should not sacrifice the necessity to reach a
thorough and fair result for the sake of expediency. Second, the
use of a similar type of decision-making standard has not de-
creased judicial economy in the area of divorce law.'
There are many alternatives that can be implemented by court
152. 581 N.E.2d 30 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
153. Flynn, 581 N.E.2d at 32-33. The precise formula worked like this: the
court first determined the partnership's overhead allowance expressed as a per-
centage of gross income based on previously filed income tax returns. Id. Then the
court used the following formula:
A: fee
B: overhead % of partnership
C: number of months case pending
D: total number of months case pending
E: % interest of each partner in the firm
Each partner's B x C





155. See Howard S. Erlanger, Elizabeth Chambliss, & Marygold S. Melli, Partic-
ipation and Flexibility In Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21
LAw & SOC. REV. 585 (1987) (discussing the relationship between divorce rules and
settlement). Erlanger, Chambliss and Melli claim that in the area of divorce, the
overwhelming majority of cases, over 90% by some estimates, are settled by the
parties. Id. at 585.
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systems with respect to these types of disputes. For example, a
court can order the parties to submit to mediation 5 or submit
to arbitration157 in lieu of or before a case could be adjudicated
by a judge and/or jury. The use of these alternative dispute reso-
lution systems would enhance the goal of judicial economy while
preserving the ultimate rights of the parties to an adjudication
by the courts.
In addition, these types of disputes may be more suited for a
voluntary arbitration procedure sponsored by a Bar Associa-
tion. "'58 The adverse publicity and potentially disruptive effects
on clients could both be avoided by the use of a private dispute
resolution system.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined section 401(h) of the RUPA and its
impact on the interplay of law firm dissolutions and contingent
fee cases. Because the No Compensation Rule has the potential
to yield harsh and unfair results, to discourage the fiduciary duty
among partners, to undermine client choice, and to defeat the
principle of freedom of contract, it warrants revision. Section
401(h) of the RUPA, by allowing compensation when it is equita-
ble to do so, eliminates the problems created by the application of
the No Compensation Rule.
In applying the No Compensation Rule and the Unfinished
Business Rule to the scene described in the beginning of this
Article, under the UPA and the No Compensation Rule the an-
swer to the partners' concerns would be clear. Based on the appli-
cation of these rules, the dissolving partner would be required to
156. Mediation is a process where a neutral third party tries to facilitate an
agreement between disputing parties. The Pennsylvania Bar Association sponsors a
Lawyer Dispute Resolution Program which includes mediation. The program handles
disputes involving law firm dissolutions, intra-firm disputes, and fee disputes be-
tween lawyers in different firms.
157. For example, Pennsylvania requires all civil claims involving $50,000 in
larger countries and $25,000 in smaller ones to be submitted to a board of three
lawyers who are members of the bar of the court for decision. Although participation
is compulsory, the parties are not bound by the arbitration panel's decision. Either
party may appeal the decision; this appeal is in the form of a "trial de novo" in the
trial court of general jurisdiction (Court of Common Pleas). See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
7361 (1982 & Supp. 1994).
158. See COMMITrEE ON ARBITRATION AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
PROPOSAL FOR ASSOCIATION-SPONSORED ARBITRATION OF DIsPUTEs AMONG LAWYERS,
42 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 877, 878 (1987). Such programs are already in place in
Cleveland, Denver, New York City, San Francisco, and Pennsylvania. See also Laurel
Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice Consequences of Law Firm Breakups, 61
TEMP. L. Q. 1055, 1124-26 (1988).
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complete the contingency fee cases. To the extent that the resolu-
tion of these cases is successful, under the UPA, the income gen-
erated from these cases would go back to the dissolving partner-
ship to be divided according to each partner's respective interest
in the firm. If the award from the contingent fee cases totalled
$800,000 and each partner had a 25% interest in the firm, each
partner would receive $200,000 regardless of the extra burden
placed on the dissolving partner. At most, the dissolving partner
completing the cases might re-coup some portion of his office
overhead expenses incurred in bringing about a successful conclu-
sion.
However, the RUPA applies a different approach. If the wind-
ing up burdens of the partners are not disproportionate to each
other, the No Compensation Rule might still be applied and no
extra compensation would be awarded. However, to the extent
that the winding up burdens of each partner are disproportionate
to each other, the RUPA would authorize the award of extra
compensation.
The balancing approach set forth in this Article is needed to
resolve this tension. The four factors are designed to provide a
comprehensive and thorough analysis as to whether to award
compensation and how to calculate the actual amount of compen-
sation to award. This approach will neither encourage or discour-
age law firm dissolutions. Finally, the dissolution of the firm
would become a non-economic issue for the client.
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